EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
is essay examines the social and political roles of religious gures in southern Afghanistan in an attempt to develop a more nuanced understanding of the present insurgency.
MAIN FINDINGS
Islamic groups and Afghan mullahs play a critical role in politics in southern Afghanistan.
e Taliban, Deobandis, Su s, and Tablighi Jamaat are the most important religious groups and in uences in southern Afghanistan.
Religion and politics are blurred as religious authorities frequently shi between religious and political roles. e West has had a tendency to misunderstand the relevance and implications of these roles.
Jihad is an important feature of Islamic life in southern Afghanistan. Large numbers of southern insurgents are waging jihad for the implementation of sharia (Islamic law). Several predominant religious gures and in uences tend to advocate jihad. e West has underestimated the role of jihad in the present Taliban movement.
e ulema council in southern Afghanistan represents a sector of the clergy that has remained relatively un-radicalized by war. Insurgents and jihadists have frequently assassinated members of this council because it o ers legitimate opposition to the Taliban's radicalization of young madrasah students and unemployed villagers. e political activities of two Islamic groups that represent a large number of rural and poor Afghans are misunderstood. Some Su groups in Kandahar have allied with insurgents since 2003 and have promoted rural resistance to secular authority. e Tablighi Jamaat, though avowedly apolitical and detached from the insurgency, has a relationship with the mujahedeen who regularly attend this group's meetings.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Political and military strategies aimed at countering the Taliban insurgency while ignoring the Taliban jihad are ill-founded and will probably not succeed.
Currently there is very little contact between NATO or ISAF and the ulema of southern Afghanistan. Rather than stereotype all religious leaders and institutions as militant fundamentalist, policies that incorporate certain religious groups into civil society should be considered.
ere is a critical need to x the corrupt justice system in Afghanistan. A central component of the Taliban's strategy to win the trust and con dence of the Afghan population is based on the role of Taliban mullahs as arbitrators of individual and community disputes. is "shadow" justice system is proving very popular.
e more we stress Islam as a unit of analysis, the more we face the dangers of abstraction and unwarranted generalization. Islam keeps us mired in debates about normativity, where an emphasis on Muslims allows us to appreciate the dynamic nature of Islam as a lived experience. 1 R eligious authorities play a critical role in the present con ict in Afghanistan.
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Consider, for example, the fact that virtually all Taliban leaders, from the senior regional leadership down to subcommanders at the district level, are mullahs 3 (religious leaders).
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Indeed it is reasonable to argue that the present con ict in Afghanistan represents a classic insurgency wrapped in the religious narratives of jihad.
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Although a broad majority of the foot soldiers in this insurgency might be "accidental guerrillas," 6 the leaders are for the most part committed Afghan religious gures. Hence, to understand this con ict and its nuances, it is important to attempt to understand the religious gures and phenomena in Afghanistan as well as their societal roles. 8 e role of religious gures in insurgencies and jihads has been a mainstay of Afghanistan's history. David Edwards argues that Afghan religious personalities are central to the moral authority as well as to the "contradictions" of Afghan society. ese contradictions together with the "arti ciality of the Afghan nation-state" re ect critical, historical components of the "deep structure" of Afghan con ict.
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Regimes ranging from Hamid Karzai's to the era of Amanullah Khan (1919-29) have been existentially threatened by, and have had di culties in subduing, rural religious conservative insurgencies. is has especially been the case when Afghan state authority has been perceived to challenge or o end traditional Islamic values.
e national political dominance in Afghan politics of organized religious groups compared to dynastic monarchical groups, however, is a rather new phenomenon.
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Historically, the degree of regime success in subduing an Afghan insurgency has largely been a function of the extent to which the regime is viewed as legitimate in the eyes of the population. Critical here is the fact that since the time of the Achaemenids and the Parthians history has demonstrated that the legitimacy of Afghan governance is derived from two immutable sources: dynastic sources, usually in the NBR SPECIAL REPORT FEBRUARY 2010 form of monarchies and tribal patriarchies, and religious sources.
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is problem of legitimacy is especially acute at the local and village level of rural Pashtun society, for whom dynastic and religious authority has been paramount for over a thousand years. 12 e objective of this essay is to brie y address issues of Islam, politics, and the dynamics of religious authority in southern Afghanistan-the traditional spiritual center of the country and a signi cant focus of Taliban insurgent activity.
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In doing so, this essay will examine the following topics: the cultural and religious mores and tropes of Loy Kandahar, the ulema shura 14 of southern Afghanistan, the role that the Afghan media plays in legitimizing gures of religious authority and how certain religious gures manipulate this media attention, the Taliban's strategic use of symbols and the media to gain legitimacy, and the Tablighi Jamaat and Su s in southern Afghanistan. ese extremely complex topics will be addressed using anecdotal experience and evidence, interviews conducted in the region over the last few years, and other data gathered, in part, in greater southern Afghanistan.
e fundamental question that this paper seeks to address is that of Islam's public persona: who speaks for Islam in Afghanistan? e extent of the historical and cultural tradition of these religious gures' political involvement is then examined, for where there is religious in uence there is also bound to be some element of power play. Subsidiary questions look into what the sources of these religious gures' in uence are, how these sources are changing, and what the fundamental factors of this in uence are-i.e. the base societal conditions in southern Afghanistan and how they shape the way religious gures can operate.
Southern Afghanistan is an interesting case study in part because so little has been written on the exact dynamics of the interaction between religion and politics, even for a group as prominent as the Taliban. e area of "greater Kandahar" remains the spiritual and strategic heart of the present con ict, and as such an increased understanding of the religious dimension can help prevent mistakes borne of ignorance and impoverished assumptions.
ere is no doubt that religious gures have, are, and will continue to play a central role in militant mobilizations in Afghanistan. Understanding such mobilizations is ultimately the goal of this essay.
Cultural and Religious In uences in Southern Afghanistan
Nearly all Afghans are Muslim, with Islam serving as a common frame of reference and key cognitive driver for the vast majority of the population. Undoubtedly, Islam is the only characteristic that nearly all Afghans have in common. Yet popular Islamic ideas and beliefs are rooted in a mix of culture, self-interpreted religious views, tribal values, money, in uence, and personal connections. Although religion has clearly helped to shape Afghan values systems and codes of behavior for generations, it would nevertheless be wrong to infer that this fact results in unanimity of opinion concerning all things Muslim. Islam is not a monolithic entity in Afghanistan just as Christianity is not a monolithic entity in the United States or Europe. Afghan Islam encompasses a wide range of opinions-including reformists, foreign-educated progressives, ascetics, radicals, Sala sts, Deobandis, Talibs, and conservative judicial scholars, among others. All of these can be pro-government or anti-government (and sometimes both), West-loving or West-hating; there is no uniformity of opinion. Moreover, it would be a mistake to assume that all southern political, economic, and social behavior is driven merely by religious dynamics. A variety of intervening variables such as the urban-rural divide, geography, culture, and quams 15 and a nity groups are also important in uences that must be recognized.
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ese intervening variables of in uence will be the next topic of assessment and discussion.
Rural Population Distribution
e most important and relevant division within southern Afghan society, the divide between urban and rural populations, is o en glossed over by Western analysts. Cleavages between the urban and rural populations of Loy (Greater) Kandahar 17 have long been a driving force of southern politics, social interactions, and con icts as well as aspects of Islamic practice.
Population statistics dating back to 2004 (the best and most recent data available) demonstrate that only 12% of southern Afghans belong to urban communities in Loy Kandahar; rural society makes up 88% of the population (see Figure 1) . When you look outside Kandahar Province, the gures become even starker with only 5%, 2%, and 4% for the residents of Helmand, Uruzgan, and Zabul provinces respectively living in urban environments. e south is primarily a rural environ and this fact is important when we consider the role religious gures play in southern Afghanistan.
ere is no question that urban and rural Afghanistan have distinct cultures.
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ese cultures in turn play a signi cant role in determining how a particular person or group of people will behave and respond to certain types of authority gures-be they religious or political, or conservative, moderate, or radical.
Attempts to modernize the south (and the never-ending con ict between the traditional and the modern) are central concerns of the area's ideological battleground. Attempts to institute modern political or social agendas have not necessarily been met with enthusiasm in Loy Kandahar. Consider, for example, how the south responded to the recent "democratic" elections held in Afghanistan. While the vast majority of Afghan provinces had registered voter turnout rates for the 2005 provincial elections of 60%-70%, the provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan, and Zabul had rates of 25. 3%, 36.8%, 23.4%, and 20% respectively. 19 Interviews conducted this past summer among village elders and leaders in Kandahari districts suggest that there was little interest in the 2009 presidential election or local provincial and district elections in the south.
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In fact, it was further posited during these interviews that the Taliban were not overly interested in attempting to disrupt these elections because of the apparent apathy of the Kandaharis toward them.
21
ough the day of what would ultimately turn out to be a blatantly corrupt election did see a spike in insurgent activities, it was not as intense as the Americans or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) expected.
e village continues to be a pivotal and de ning institution of life in southern Afghanistan, and many villagers view Kandahar City with suspicion and disdain. For a society that-at least on one level-is as traditional as Afghanistan, the concern of much of the southern rural population is that Kandahar City is a source of corruption and iniquity. Indeed, the Taliban regularly play on this belief and consider the city as the area where in dels live. Further, the Taliban use this justi cation to legitimize their attacks in the city.
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Geography e e ect of Afghanistan's geography is o en underestimated as a factor that in uences social behavior. In southern Afghanistan, the distances involved, high levels of insecurity, and the sometimes di cult terrain between villages have helped give rise to the "one-family-one-mosque" phenomenon, which is discussed below. In addition, isolated and fairly inaccessible locations are prevalent in the south, helping to create a culture of "traveling mullahs" who satisfy the need for gures of authority-sometimes simply to mediate local disputes. Many of these mullahs also 21 Personal interviews with district and village elders, Kandahar City, May-June 2009.
22 Personal interview with Kandahari citizen, Kandahar City, September 2008. is same interviewee told the story of a friend who was apprehended by Taliban. is person told his abductors that he was a nurse-not a government employee or o cial-and served all people. e Taliban replied that they had "permission" and a duty to kill all "Muslim in dels" (but not their women and children) who live in Kandahar City.
help to solidify the Taliban narrative through preaching and, indeed, encouraging and prompting individuals to join the insurgency against Kabul and the "in dels." e geography of irrigated lands of southern Afghanistan especially around Kandahar City has also played a role in de ning certain social norms and in uences. As omas Bar eld has suggested "these rich irrigated lands…[supported] a hierarchical political system that required large agricultural surpluses to sustain them. It supported an elite of landowners whose tribal followers had in many cases been reduced to their economic clients." 23 is factor has signi cantly in uenced the agrarian economy of southern Afghanistan as well as the development of important landowner families in the politics and social structure of the region, such as the Durrani Mohammadzais and Popalzais.
Kandahar's typography also in uences the security situation in the province. e southern half of Kandahar is dominated by sparsely inhabited deserts and a porous border with Pakistan, accented by the large border-crossing at Spin Boldak, where both licit and illicit goods transit through every day. e northern portion of Kandahar consists of wadis (dry riverbeds) and hilly terrain and lacks reliable roadways, making the region ideal for guerilla activity and the use of improvised explosive devices. Furthermore, the rocky, inhospitable terrain of western Uruzgan Province, which borders northern Kandahar, has provided a necessary refuge for the training, resting, and cycling of Taliban foot soldiers into the southern Afghanistan provinces.
Pashtun Society and Culture
Pashtun society and culture is the dominant in uence in southern Afghanistan, not least because Pashtuns make up the vast majority of the population and because the south has been historically the heartland of Pashtun in uence in Afghanistan as a whole. Exact demographic statistics are impossible to come by, and the last accurate census was conducted decades ago, but it is safe to assume that at least 85% of the population in southern Afghanistan is ethnically Pashtun.
At the expense of overgeneralizing, Pashtuns tend to be pragmatic individuals who usually come to recognize early in their lives the core importance of their religion and relations with religious authorities.
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Village mullahs, whose role in rural communities has evolved over the centuries, are complemented by religious gures such as sayyeds. e family lineage of sayyeds is traced to the lineage of the Prophet, qazis, or religious law experts/shariah judges-either mawlawi, who teach at a higher level in religious schools (madaris) or pirs, who teach at Su madaris or at collective prayer sites where Su s congregate.
Depending on a particular situation, people will be more or less tempered by their interactions with and the roles of local religious gures, resulting in one of the reasons that the religious makeup and identity of many southern Pashtuns is so di cult to de ne. For a traditional religious elder-a mullah or mawlawi, for instance-mediation and con ict resolution is an essential part of his mandate and identity, but this role also forms part of the basis of that same identity and authority. Both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan as well as in the border areas, religious elders have played this role since the early nineteenth century. Sana Haroon, for example, explores the little-understood traditional role of the rural mullah as the Pashtun equivalent of the circuitriding judge in nineteenth century America, serving as an impartial arbiter of disputes between clans (khels).
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Even in a jirga (a village council that has legislative and judicial authority for the tribal community) the authority of the elder mullah in convoking religious legitimacy over the proceedings is greater than many appreciate, especially in the form of mediation. e implications of this authority for the present insurgency in Afghanistan are signi cant, and the Taliban are well aware of this and use it to their advantage.
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Nevertheless, in deference to the implicit implications of the role of the rural mullah, religious authority only extends as far as the people let it. e idea of near-total subservience to gures of religious authority has little basis in fact in Afghanistan. A good example of this that is little understood in the West is the obscure phenomenon of "onefamily-one-mosque" that is especially prominent in southern rural areas.
Family Culture
Loy Kandahari villages will o en consist entirely of members of a single extended family (kahol) or clan (khel). Where di erent families or groups coexist in one area, there will o en be one mosque for each of the individual families. ough particularly prominent in the south, this has been observed in communities from Khost Province in eastern Afghanistan to Farah Province in the southwest.
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Although this phenomenon is also witnessed in the Afghan environs of rich or wealthy landowners who are known to construct mosques to help improve their public standing, one would expect it to be rarer in poverty-stricken rural areas. e one-mosque-one-family concept promotes religious dynamics that are highly personal and relatively immune to rhetoric and manipulation by outside forces, and it is o en di cult for mass movements and popular uprisings to signi cantly penetrate these mosques. For example, a prominent family will not only be responsible for physically building the mosque but also for the selection of the mosque's mullah. During a recent research trip in southern Afghanistan, the author inquired to a prominent landowner, who had built a new mosque for his family in the village of Deh-e Bagh in the Dand District of Kandahar Province, as to what would happen if the mullah of the mosque started preaching in a way inconsistent with his family's beliefs or political orientations. e elder responded that "this would never happen because I hired the mullah and I would re him if such preaching occurred. He works for me and will follow my instructions concerning such matters."
While the one-family-one-mosque concept has a tendency to insulate people from certain aspects of political Islam, the concept of jihad has the opposite e ect.
28
Historically, the connection between Islam and jihad has been extremely important for Kandahar with disenfranchised Afghans responding to the unifying call of jihad as a reaction to perceived corruption, government failure, and outside interference.
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In fact, jihad has traditionally represented a kind of public sphere of Kandahari Islam, where religious authority gures can command more immediate support and obedience of the public. e call of "Islam under threat" is an extremely powerful incentive for public and communal action and historically has been a consistent motivator and force for Kandaharis to stand behind.
RELIGIOUS FIGURES, INSURGENCY, AND JIHAD JOHNSON

Everyday Islamic Traditions
Islam, of course, is not just about following rules. e core of Islam-as with most religions-is the provision of principles for living a moral life, and the regular daily cycle of prayers can remind the faithful of these values. It is for this reason that Kandaharis will o en make reference to the idea of living a more moral life, even if they do not necessarily always follow it to its conclusion. A sampling of the key dimensions of southern Afghanistan's Islamic traditions is presented below.
Namaz. Islam a ects the everyday life of a southern Afghan in a variety of ways. e ve daily prayers, namaz,
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for the most part, are integrated into the rhythm of the Afghan day. It is not seen as an interruption to stop what one is doing to pray. A corollary example of this is the use of a patu (patkai) on which to pray. A woolen blanket used during the day (especially during the winter) as a wrap-around cloak is taken o , put on the oor, and prayers are made there. e patu is a good indication and re ective of the e ortless ubiquity of Islam in the daily life of Afghans.
Zakat. Another Islamic concept that demands mention is zakat (alms for the poor). Zakat is followed and o en employed by the Taliban as a motivating force to encourage villagers to contribute funds or assets to their cause.
Sharia courts. Yet another extremely important dynamic are sharia (Islamic law) courts that represent a popular alternative to government legal institutions, which have been marred by years of corruption and ine cient legal processes. In numerous areas, especially in the rural southern Pashtun hinterlands, the Taliban are perceived as not only doing a better job of governancevia "shadow" provincial and district governments-and providing justice than Kabul; the Taliban are also seen as more legitimate than the distant and unpopular leadership in Kabul.
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roughout southern Afghanistan, the Taliban have established parallel government systems including provincial and district level administrators, police chiefs, and judges; just how e ective or widespread these informal power structures are is di cult to assess.
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But one element of the Taliban's shadow government that has been particularly popular throughout Loy Kandahar is the alternative judicial system. Today, faced with a choice between a protracted case before an inscrutable system of state justice, in which he who can pay the highest bribes to the most people over the longest period of time invariably wins, the Pashtuns are instead turning in droves to the rapid, transparent justice of the mullahs of the Taliban. Justice and, particularly, mediation are indeed a traditional part of the mullahs' role in the community and the Taliban have masterfully played on this reality.
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Madrasah. e institution of the madrasah, too, is an important feature of the day-to-day landscape of southern Afghanistan. e role that madaris have played in the political life of southern Afghanistan has uctuated over the years and, since the 1980s, permanently changed in character-endowing the religious clergy with political power and in uence. is culminated in the "clerical revolution" (with popular backing) of the Taliban in 1994. According to Olivier Roy, 30 At dawn (fajr), at noon (dhuhr), in the a ernoon (asr), at sunset (maghrib), and at nightfall (ishaa).
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is was a common theme among the 60 or so village elders, tribal leaders, and even some Afghan government leaders interviewed by the author in various locations in Afghanistan, August-September, 2008 and May-June 2009 . It is important to note, however, that the desire of locals for Taliban court systems because of corruption and ine ciency of the government's system. In rural communities most of the legal matters relating to land and crime would never have been legislated by the government (even in the 1970s) and as such that people go to the Taliban courts is not so surprising. For a recent discussion of the Taliban court systems, see "Afghanistan: In Search of Justice, " National Public Radio, webpage, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=98121740.
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the Afghan Taliban is the only contemporary Islamic movement whose basis is a network of rural madaris, e ectively tapping the well of rural southern Afghan conservatism and puritanism.
34 e full history of this change is beyond the scope of this short essay, but the profound e ect this had on communities should not be underestimated.
Jihad and a History of Con ict
As suggested above, jihad is another important feature of Islamic life in southern Afghanistan. In many respects waging jihad has become a cornerstone of Islamic identity for many southern Afghans, as they have assumed the struggle for the predominance of God's will, both within oneself and between other people. ough this will be explored more fully in later sections of this paper, it is very important to understand that a large number of southern insurgents are ghting in support of jihad and the implementation of sharia among other religious and ideological positions.
In contrast with the sheer numbers who volunteered for jihad in the 1980s, however, the calls of mullah networks are perhaps a less important in uence in the present con ict than the chronic unemployment and social stagnation as of 2009. In the 1980s social structures were more active and in uential, creating a framework for recruitment. And while this is not necessarily the case today, it would nevertheless be imprudent to discount the importance of jihad in southern religious life. is is especially true when assessing the motivations of the local as well as regional leaders of the Taliban.
ere are a variety of other factors that in uence the politics and relations of Afghans in the south. Con ict itself is an important factor that since the early 1970s has had a preeminent in uence on southern society. Over 30 years of con ict have given the people of the south a somewhat unpredictable nature-in part stemming from a desire for self-preservation-that sometimes can work in opposition to core cultural and societal values of Islam or Pashtunwali (the unwritten Pashtun tribal code). In the wartime atmosphere of Kandahar, Helmand, or Zabul, there is a strong feeling of polarization, that others "are either with us or against us." is applies across the spectrum of the population's relations with the government, tribal elders, businessmen, and the Taliban, as well as to the foreign forces operating in the south.
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One of the very signi cant consequences of the Afghan's anti-Soviet jihad of the late 1970s and 1980s was the destruction of the Pashtun temporal maliks 36 and khans and their replacement by Islamist mullahs as power brokers. is became even more important when Pakistan helped push the Taliban into Afghanistan in the 1990s.
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Pakistan purposefully deconstructed the traditional tribal order in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in an e ort to promote radical Islamist mullahs who could recruit for the Afghan mujahideen in their con ict against the Soviet occupiers. e British rst introduced the maliki system, which Pakistan retained. is system was aimed at creating reliable local elite whose loyalty could be rewarded by the state through special status, nancial bene ts, and o cial recognition of in uence over the tribes. It was intended to provide a single spokesman for a khel with whom the British administration could deal in an attempt to replicate the Sandeman system among the egalitarian Pashtun.
Political and Economic Elites
Islam should not be seen as the only in uence on the lives of southern Afghans. In Kandahar City the top class of businessmen or political leadership are not necessarily the most principled group, nor are they especially religious. Money, narcotics, and in uence are important factors for this group, and religion has a more limited impact on their lives as compared to other segments of society. In fact, to understand Kandahari society one needs to understand the three secular layers of in uence in Kandahar: family, khel, and tribal interests; licit business relationships; and illicit business relationships. For example, today Kandahari political, economic, and social dynamics cannot be fully understood without considering the tribal relations and competitions between, for example, the Popolzai, Barakzai, Noorzai, Alikozai, and Achakzai tribal entities and respective leaders such as Ahmed Wali Karzai, Mohammad Shah, Amir Lalai, Gul Agha Sherzai, Khalid Pashtun, Tor Jan, Aref Noorzai, Haji Safullah, Haji Mirwais Noorzai, Karimullah Naqib, Haji Agha Lalai Dastageri, Khan Mohammad, Talih Agha Karimullah, Haji Kareem Khan, and Abdul Razziq. In addition, the explicit business enterprises of leading Kandahari powerbrokers such as Ahmed Wali Karzai and Razia Agha Sherzai, as well as his brother Gul Agha Sherzai, who is a former governor of Kandahar and powerbroker extraordinaire, and their patrons are of similar importance. Finally, the milieu of contracts emanating from the ISAF's presence in southern Afghanistan and who gets what from whom are critical in mapping the Kandahari power elite.
ese political and nancial elites of course do not hesitate to seem more or less religious as the situation demands. Religious gures thus may not have speci c temporal power; however, they o en prove instrumental in certain transactions that would otherwise be problematic.
Religion and Authority in Southern Afghanistan
[We should regard] as political all actors and activities involved in the establishment, maintenance or contestation of particular visions of public morality ("the good") and of social order.
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Both mullahs and formally trained Islamic legal scholars, alim (singular of ulema), are signi cant and in uential religious gures in southern Afghanistan. While village mullahs have ideally studied Islamic traditions (hadith) and Islamic law ( qh), their actual formal education will vary from basically none to signi cant madrasah training. All mullahs, however, will lead mosque prayer sessions and conduct religious rituals such as birth rites, marriage, and funeral services at the village level. ey are basically "ritual practitioners," in the words of Oliver Roy.
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Mullahs have traditionally served as spiritual advisors to village elders, jurgas, and shuras and, for the most part, have been inconsequential to village politics. It has also been suggested that mullahs serve as the custodians of the principals of pashtunwali and "use their religious authority to pass binding judgments rooted in [pashtunwali] Historically the vast majority of mullahs have rarely been militant. A mullah's basic legitimacy customarily has come from his application of sharia and defense of the Islamic community. 42 e role of the mullah has changed drastically with the rise of the Taliban, however. ough they were once primarily apolitical, serving the role of a glori ed notary public, mullahs are now the leading political and ideological gures and voices of the Afghan insurgency. e present role of many mullahs in providing narratives and information to the village population has become a critical source of their in uence and is the subject of the next section of this paper.
The Roles and Authority of Mullahs in Southern Afghanistan
Who controls the ow of information is vitally important in southern Afghanistan, and the control of religious information is intimately in uenced by language and the relative lack of education realized in the southern Pashtun areas. Most of the population does not understand Arabic. is results in the Muslim faithful being almost entirely dependent on the local mullah to teach and interpret the words and lessons of the Koran. In many instances, especially in the rural southern hinterland, the mullah himself has no in-depth knowledge of Arabic and thus will rely on local traditions and oral narratives in his religious teachings and lessons. is interpretive duty results in considerable power for the mullahs.
e control of information also has an impact on the role of religious gures as mediators; they are seen as being both impartial and possessing a broader perspective as well as possessing pertinent legal expertise that allows them to pass judgment on certain issues. For example, the institution of the "Friday sermon," a speech to the gathered faithful, which o en touches on political issues (remember that there is considerably less distinction between politics and religion when compared with much Western religious thought). In many respects this sermon is an extension of their authority. Mullahs now regularly pass judgment on local political or governmental personalities as well as critique political and social situations.
Mullahs gain some of this authority through the receipt of foreign aid, much in the form of zakat, particularly from Middle Eastern and South Asian sources. Some of this aid, distributed through mosques, is most certainly aimed at strengthening the authority of the religious gures. Mullahs have become a focal point of resource distribution, and as such their authority has been strengthened.
Ulema Council
is religious interpretation of the rebellion was promoted by the ulema and the mullahs, a group strongly united in their struggle against the communist authorities, who had proclaimed a jihad against the regime. Represented everywhere in the country, they constituted an informal but e cient network for the transmission of information, as the rebellion of 1929 had already shown. In instances where the uprising was coordinated, for example in Logar [sic] or in Ghazni, the ulema played the leading role. In most insurrections the sermons of the mullahs were crucial: the people o en assembled at the mosque before marching on the government command post. In the mosques, the habitual scene for discussion among the villagers, the mullah would use his in uence to put forward a religious exegesis of resistance to authority, and his intervention o en served to convince the hesitant by removing their doubts as 42 Roy, e Failure of Political Islam, 3, 29. to the illegitimacy of the authorities….With the proclamation of jihad by the ulema the rebellion took on a universal nature.
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e social and political role of mullahs and ulema has been crucial throughout the past 40 years of Afghan history. Looking back even further to the past two centuries, and including the Pakistani border areas, a trend of increased in uence is evident, legitimized by a wide variety of dynamics. In Kandahar, mullah networks and the ulema council 44 operate side by side as of 2009, but broadly speaking they are ideologically opposed to each other. e legitimacy of both these groups is drawn from a variety of sources, but three factors are worth considering here: tribes, age, and wealth.
Regardless of what members of ulema may say in interviews, the tribe that someone comes from is an important factor in the level of respect for that person-even before graduating from a madrasah.
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Similarly, age is important only in that it takes time for an alim to mature as a gure and gain respect in society. Shia ulema tend to be younger, and a younger, more active member of the Shia clergy can advance and make a name for himself-within reason. It is doubtful, however, that Afghanistan, outside of the Hazarajat, will ever be fertile ground for the Shia.
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us, ulema in Afghanistan tend to be older members of society.
Wealth-of paramount importance to the non-religious or tribal oligarchy-is relatively unimportant for the ulema and mullah network. Popular opinion, as well as a whole host of folklore and proverbs, considers mullahs as de facto poor. e image of the mullah asking for money from the rich man is a common stereotype in Kandahari society. In many respects, however, this is a self-created narrative. In fact, grants of land and nancial contributions to the mosques, and the establishment of madaris connected to the mosques, have served to make the mullahs among the wealthiest men in some rural areas in terms of total assets.
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In Kandahar, aside from the signi cant role that the religious clergy took post-1994, there was no ulema council in the form that currently exists. e traditional role of the religious clergy was to assist in religious administrative duties (all the traditional aspects that we commonly associate with the clergy), to serve as part of the Haj and Awqaf ministry, and to serve in the Ministry of Justice. e ulema council in the south (with Kandahar as the focal point) represents a sector of the religious clergy that has remained relatively unradicalized by war. For example, consider Haji Mahmoud (originally from the Khakrez District of Kandahar Province).
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He is a writer, poet, and member of the ulema council and views his role as being quite simple: encouraging those who wish for a continuation of the con ict to start interacting with society in a more peaceful manner. is is not to suggest that Shia do not exist in the south. ere are important pockets of Shia Pashtuns in the Loy Kandahar, but their societal and political importance is slight. appointed to that position by Asadullah Khaled, the former governor of Kandahar-a fact that helps illustrate one aspect of the relatively unclear relationship between the Afghan government and the ulema in Kandahar.
e council consists of approximately 60 or 70 clerics from within the city and 5 or 6 from every district in the province, leading to a total of 140 or 150 mullahs and mawlawis who participate in the council. Some of the clergy in the city occasionally o er advice or counsel to the Afghan government (to the governor, for example), and there is even the possibility of outreach to Kabul via the central ulema council there and its head, Shinwari Saheb (Borhanullah Shinwari, former Afghan attorney general). e council's political "face" also extends as far as appearances in the local media: members write articles for newspapers and magazines, speak regularly on radio programs, and are quite frequently invited as guests onto local television stations.
Interactions of the Afghan domestic security apparatus-for example, Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS)-with the ulema in Kandahar are clouded in secrecy, and it is di cult to determine the nature of explicit relationships with any degree of certainty. It is relatively clear though that government agencies are at the very least attempting to use the ulema as their eyes and ears in the districts. With tens of thousands of agents around the country, the ulema and mullah networks around the province would be a ripe resource for domestic security services, but it is highly likely that there are a signi cant number of paid informants among the ulema.
Some members of the religious clergy-certain prominent families within the city, for exampleuse religious legitimacy as a way to enhance their personal status and business interests. is can be purely an issue of status (for example, being called into advise the governor on a regular basis) or can be nancial (i.e., receiving more contracts from foreign militaries for construction projects or private and convoy security duties). ere is, however, very little contact between NATO/ISAF and the ulema of southern Afghanistan. In some ways, this is regrettable:
Lack of familiarity, not knowing how to engage, and political sensitivities in donor home countries can partly explain the lack of engagement from the side of the international community. Further, stereotyping of religious leaders and institutions as militant fundamentalists-o en equated with the Taliban and radical madrasas-makes it di cult politically to include religious actors and institutions as partners in civil society. Within the Afghan government and the international community, many seem to be having concerns about making religious actors more powerful by granting them formal authority and recognition.
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Assassinations and the Impact of Con ict Mawlawi Fayyaz famously stripped Mullah Omar of his legendary Amir ul-Mumineen (commander of the believers or faithful) status during a public sermon (although it is debatable whether Fayyaz actually had the religious authority to do so) and survived numerous attempts against his life before insurgent gunmen eventually succeeded in murdering him.
Afghan ulema are probably targeted because they o er a legitimate opposition to the radical mobilizations and motivations o ered by the Taliban to young madrasah students and the unemployed. is is not to suggest that the insurgency is only primarily motivated by ideology or religion. Many ulema council members are actively and deliberately provocative. ey write articles, make pronouncements, and issue statements arguing, for example, that suicide bombing is an illegitimate form of jihad.
It is important to recognize that Afghanistan, and especially southern Afghanistan, is a region where con ict and war have been staples of daily life for over 30 years. is changes a society. Money (and the resultant status it brings) becomes one of the most important assets-people have less opportunity to exercise the luxury of having principles. It is clear that Islam throughout Afghanistan is radicalized and further politicized by con ict.
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is has resulted in less room for nuance in argumentation or for an intellectually formulated opinion, and this ultimately works against the members of the ulema council. At the same time, con ict also has a tendency to reinforce the need for gures of authority like the mullahs within society.
Media and Religious Authority
While new arenas of religious discourse have certainly been created, this does not necessarily mean that the messages, values and norms communicated within these spaces are also new. It can be argued that in many cases traditional forms of authority and articulation work very well in new media spaces, and indeed, have used these spaces to reach out to an expanded audience base.
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Southern Afghanistan is commonly viewed as a provincial backwater, a place where new trends are rare and where ancient and xed ideas hold sway. e Taliban are supposedly a symptom of this alleged cultural and social malaise; frequently, however, the Taliban are portrayed as being the innovators and consumers of techniques and technologies of the mass media and communication.
54
In fact, this apparent paradox does not exist outside Western analyses of structures of religious authority and their means of communication. e religious clergy are probably the leading authority and experts on nuanced communications in southern Afghanistan. For example, the clergy utilizes locally e ective media, from radio to print, to transmit culturally appropriate and resonant messages to a local audience. Likewise, the Taliban in general are extremely e ective communicators and run a viable, in uential information campaign through the south of the country. Nothing that NATO or ISAF produces approaches this level of e ectiveness or sophistication.
55 is e ective use of the media in turn strengthens the authority of the communicator. As suggested above, information is one of the most important currencies in southern Afghanistan, and a prominent voice is crucial to establishing oneself as someone who possesses such information, which is exactly the reason why the ulema shura devotes so much time to communication work. e Taliban rightly see the continuation of this work as threatening to the transmission of their messages and thus attempt to stop the work of the ulema through a strategy of assassinations. e use of media by religious gures of authority is simultaneously targeted and di use.
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Television is one such method, with mullahs and mawlawis frequently being interviewed in the studio or via telephone and consulted as experts. e Taliban manufacture DVDs and video clips suitable for viewing on mobile phones that are distributed to the target audience as well as to Afghan and foreign media outlets.
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e author, for example, witnessed Taliban videos and musical propaganda being downloaded from one person's cell phone to another through the use of Bluetooth technologies in Kandahar City in June 2009. Radio is employed to similar e ect. Newspapers (or publications of a similar style with similar means of distribution) are published by most religious gures of authority. Indeed, newspapers have traditionally been used by political parties and religiously inclined groupings to publically express their views; this practice continues to this day, in Kandahar, Kabul, and throughout the country. As suggested above, the ulema in Kandahar publish a monthly magazine.
e Internet is also used by various groups, although with a higher variance of success. Websites in Afghanistan tend to be less sophisticated than those set up by religious groups in other countries, such as Pakistan and Iran. It is perhaps understandable that Afghanistan should be somewhat behind on this, but the form is not particularly important, as the target audience, for the most part, is not Afghan. is is particularly true of the websites of the Afghan Taliban, which are not used as tools of radicalization for an Afghan target audience. Instead, these websites primarily target an international audience.
Asif Mohseni and Religious Media
e former mujahedeen commander and highly respected Shia religious scholar Asif Mohseni (his name is usually pre xed by either Ayatollah or Sheikh) is a good example of a highly engaged and sometimes pioneering member of Afghanistan's religious clergy who is presently proactively in uencing various segments of the Afghan population through the innovative use of religious media. It is instructive to identify and compare the strategies he employs "for Afghanistan's future" with those employed to supposedly similar e ect by the Taliban. is case study is not cited with speci c reference to southern Afghanistan but, rather, to compare and contrast the use of media 55 NATO has the technological capabilities but does not have the requisite linguistic and communicative expertise the Taliban have, which reaches more than just the urban areas. Although NATO can reach an urban audience, it has much more di culty reaching the majority rural population, over which the Taliban have a virtual monopoly of in uence.
56
e use of mass media by South Asian religious gures is not a new phenomenon. Haroon, Frontier of Faith, 68, for example, describes how Pashtun religious gures in what was then India (now the tribal areas of Pakistan) were impressed in the early years of the twentieth century by techniques employed by the Jamaat-i Mujahidin: "Association with the Jamaat-i Mujahidin also heightened the pro le of the mullas who had hitherto never used sophisticated methods of self-projection like printing presses. Impressed by the methods…such as posting proclamations of jihad on trees through Mardan, the Haji Turangzai acquired his own printing press in 1916. " 57 e methods the various groups employ o en overlap. Media outlets nominally aligned with the Afghan government and the broad goals of the United States and international administration o en rebroadcast these propaganda clips because they are not able to generate enough original content and are thus forced to dance to the Taliban's tune.
employed by the Taliban, and possibly to illustrate a model for a di erent kind of engagement with gures of religious authority. at is, Mohseni's vision of in uence through the media o ers an example that other religious gures will probably emulate in the future.
e 76-year old Mohseni, originally from Kandahar, led the Shia party Harakat-i-Islami during the 1980s against the Soviets, although he did not take a position in the mujahedeen government that formed in 1992 a er the fall of Najibullah. He participated at the Bonn conference in 2001 and was a strong advocate for Shia interests to be re ected in the Afghan constitution. Mohseni receives extensive funding directly from Iran, although the exact amounts are disputed. is funding has been instrumental in the two projects that he has been busy with over the past two years-a new mega-madrasah in Kabul and a television station of his own entitled Tamadon (civilization).
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Mohseni's madrasah, reportedly built at a cost of at least $5 million and half-funded by Iran, is located in west Kabul and the campus would not look out of place in a considerably more technologically developed and modernized city such as Islamabad or Tehran:
It's a sweeping co-ed campus, with lecture halls, science labs, and internet cafés. When the madrassa opens fully this year, the curriculum will consist of half Islamic study, half science, math and computer classes. is is, Mohseini [sic] says with a certain gru ness, "a radical break" from traditional syllabi.
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Tamadon, launched in 2007, was marketed as an Islamic television channel that could function in opposition to some of the more liberal stations operating out of Kabul (such as Tolo or Aina).
We are backward in all aspects. Economically, we are in the 16th or 17th century, but our televisions air ten times sexier lms (than Western countries)," said Mohseini [sic] . " is is a scandal and shame for us. We have a thousand calamities and should not be diverted," Mohseini told Reuters.
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Tamadon is sta ed by competent graduates of a training program partially conducted in Iran (either independently or on secondment to Iranian media outlets). With good equipment and training, Mohseni and his sta are well on their way to achieving a level of in uence across Afghanistan that would not otherwise have been possible.
Prominent Islamic Groups and In uences in Southern Afghanistan
Just as the distinctions between the religious and the political 61 are blurred in Pashtun and Afghan culture, so do the spheres and gures of authority frequently shi from the religious to the political (and back again). ese dynamics are in uenced by the respective experiences and historical roles that these gures played during the 1980s anti-Soviet jihad and the ensuing civil war. Yet it is important to recognize that certain sectors of the population and in uence groups prominent in other parts of the country were entirely absent in the major southern Afghan politico-religious debates of the past 30 years. For example, the Afghan Islamists of the 1970s 
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and their ideological discussions at Kabul University
62
(and later in Peshawar during the 1980s)-Burhanuddin Rabbani, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Ahmad Shah Massoudwere not very important or in uential for the Talibs of the south.
63
Ultimately, many of these key players and parties of the anti-Soviet jihad had little in uence in critical events of the region. It was the polarization of the parties along ethnic, tribal, and geographic lines that would eventually help shape the politics and narratives of the rest of the country.
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Deobandism
Deobandism is one of the principal Islamic philosophical in uences in southern Afghanistan and a prominent force in Afghan political Islam. In theory, the Deobandi school of Islam shares many of the same beliefs as Su sm
65
; however, the two schools are not in concert on the means of achieving their similar objectives to remove corruption and materialism from Islam. Whereas Su sm was a reaction to conditions under the Umayyad Caliphate-the second of the four Islamic caliphates a er the death of Mohammad-Deobandism arose as a reaction to the British colonialism in India. e two key founders of Deobandism were Hazrat Maulana Mohammad Qasim Nanautavi and Hazrat Maulana Rasheed Ahmed Gangohi, who founded the Dar ulUlum madrasah in Deoband, India, in the mid-nineteenth century that has shaped resistance tropes in the subcontinent ever since. ere are thousands of Deoband madaris in Pakistan and Afghanistan. A paradox between Deobandism and Su sm is that many Deobandis are also members of Su brotherhoods.
e teachings of Deobandism focus on strict adherence to Islamic ethical codes and the independence of Muslim lands. Attacks on Muslim lands are considered attacks on Islam and worthy of jihad.
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According to Deobandism, a Muslim's rst obligation is to his faith and then to his country. Yet Deobandism does not recognize national boundaries per se but rather holds the boundaries of the greater Islamic community (or ummah) paramount. Muslims have an obligation and duty to wage jihad in defense of Muslims anywhere they are threatened.
Deobandism falls under the Hana school of Sunni Islam and shares much in common with the teachings of many great Islamic reformers, such as Mawdudi in Pakistan, Sayyed Qutb in Egypt, and Ibn Taymiyyah, who all advocated Islamic statehood following the principles of sharia, though they di ered on the means acceptable to bring this about.
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Deobandism does not focus on mysticism and asceticism in the way that Su sm does but does encourage pious practice and is a major faith throughout South Asia. Rather than representing discrete and opposing religious worldviews, however, it is perhaps more accurate to say that these schools represent di erent modalities for gaining and engaging religious knowledge: one more scriptural, the other more emotive.
62 Much of this movement owed its organization and ideology to the in uence of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin) and had as its chief ideologues Ghulam Muhammad Niazi, Rabbani, Sayyid Musa Tawana, and others who studied at al-Azhar University in Cairo and later taught on the faculty of theology at Kabul University.
63 Other anti-Soviet jihadi Peshawar party political leaders such as Yunus Khalis and Mohammad Nabi Mohammdi had considerable in uence over the Taliban in the south, particularly in Kandahar, during this time period. Many of the Taliban core from Kandahar fought under the command of Nabi Mohammdi's local factions, including Mullah Omar. Khalis even helped radical elements in the eastern Afghanistan rise to power, including Jalaluddin Haqqani who single handedly destroyed the Zadran's malik system a er he ran Mohammad Omar Babrakzai out of Paktia, the most powerful Zadran malik during the 1980s. Mohammadi's faction helped spread the rise of madaris in southern Afghanistan and attracted many Talibs from Kandahar such as Mullah Omar.
64 For more on the polarization, see Roy, "Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan?" 206.
65 " e Deoband School drew heavily on the Su tradition of Afghanistan and was highly orthodox in its interpretation of Islam. " Peter Marsden, Taliban: War, Religion, and the New Order in Afghanistan (London: Zed Books, 1998), 79.
66 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 50-51.
67 Ibid. 51.
Deobandis are comfortable with Su sm as expressed through pious and devotional practices but take issue with the social structure of Su sm as manifested by the tariqat (brotherhoods). e Afghan constitution of 1931 guaranteed the right of the ulema to attend private religious schools, most of which were Deobandi, and until the Soviet invasion in 1979 the majority of the Afghan ulema were educated in these madaris.
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Tablighi Jamaat
Faizani probably enjoyed his greatest support among military o cers. He used the traditional Zikr circle as an avenue not just for spiritual enlightenment but also for political organizing. In tapping into the o cer corps in this way, Faizani was following a longstanding tradition of Su association with the military, a tradition that went back at least to the turn of the century and that had periodically generated considerable paranoia within the government.
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e involvement of religious groups in political activities is probably one of the most misunderstood and yet crucial elements in recent Afghan history. In light of this, it is instructive to brie y examine the activities of groups like the Tablighi Jamaat and Su s. Secretive by nature, these groups represent large numbers of Afghans, yet they remain relatively less understood (and almost completely undocumented), and their role in Afghan society underappreciated. Part of the explanation for this relates to the urban-rural divide in Afghan society. Most of the members of Su societies as well as the Tablighi Jamaat are rural and poor and not members of the urban elite.
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is is an important reason why these groups are misunderstood by both outsiders and fellow Afghans.
Tablighi Jamaat was founded in the late 1920s by Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas Kandhalawi, himself a prominent member and advocate of the revivalist conservative Deoband tradition. Present members are committed to dawa or "the call." Many of their activities are dedicated to persuading and proselytizing others to join them in either conversion, or simply just reforming and becoming a "proper Muslim." To pursue this goal, the Tablighi Jamaat has established missionaries throughout the world.
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e organization holds meetings throughout Pakistan and Afghanistan and has a proclivity for meeting in large regional centers. e annual Lahore meeting seems to be the biggest in the two countries, with hundreds of thousands of attendees. At these events the discussion revolves around religious subjects, with members of the Tablighi Jamaat projecting an avowedly apolitical stance, refusing even to talk about the situation in either Afghanistan or Pakistan. At a meeting in Kabul, however, a colleague witnessed a full lineup of almost every single signi cant mid-level mujahedeen commander from Nangarhar Province sitting in a circle together and discussing di erent interpretations of a certain hadith.
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So although politics is apparently absent from 68 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 50. the surface of such meetings, there is-in Afghanistan at least-some amount of networking happening at Tablighi Jamaat meetings and events. e Tablighi Jamaat's explicit relationship with members of the insurgency is distant and seemingly detached, and despite certain ideological similarities by virtue of their shared idolization of the culture of the village, there are no strong ties with the Taliban. A number of Kandaharis have suggested to the author that they do not like the Tablighi because "many come from Pakistan" or because they are not Kandahari and they project themselves as knowing Islam better than Kandaharis do. In fact, it was suggested that Tablighi were not welcomed in local mosques and had been even asked to leave.
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Some Western scholars have argued that the Tablighi Jamaat networks are used by al Qaeda to radicalize vulnerable sectors of society, 74 and U.S., British, Pakistani, and Afghan governments have monitored these networks closely.
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Su s e role of Su sm (Islamic mysticism, tasawwuf) in Afghanistan is similarly misunderstood.
76
e so-called mystical side of Islam, Su sm, focuses on the personal relationship between the believer and God, with the believer seeking to individualize that connection through prayer, training, and discipline (marifa). e modalities of the transmission of religious knowledge and the nature of the piri-muridi (master-student relationship) tradition in Su sm are little understood but seemingly have important implications for the Afghan insurgency. Mullah-led militant mobilizations connected closely to Pashtun cultural mores and fraternity have a long history on the Afghan-Pakistan frontier. e piri-murdi system represents a basic reformist ideology and a mode of knowledge transmission where a teacher is inherent in the knowledge. us, mullahs who learn from the same teacher, or from teachers who had a common master, share the same ideology.
is system has served as a kind of social institution and network that past jihadist movements in South Asia, such as the Hindustani fanatics Akhund Gha ur, Mullah Najmuddin of Hadda, and the Faqir of Ipi, have exploited.
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e Su mullahs and their murids (committed) and talibs operate a complex and mutually supportive network of insurgent religious authority. eir information operations-carried out through mosque, madrasah, and langarkhana (a place where food is prepared and distributed to the poor) via pedagogy 78 -have, as suggested above, underpinned past insurgencies and jihads and presumably have helped to frame the discourse of the present Taliban jihad and insurgency. An understanding of this process is a vital starting point for any campaign to combat it.
Su sm and the majority of Afghan ulema look at Islam from two di erent perspectives. e ulema focus primarily on the orderly interpretation of Islamic law and doctrine, whereas the Su s focus on the love of God through asceticism and ritual practice. 74 John Walker Lindh of "American Taliban" fame was allegedly indoctrinated by Tablighi Jamaat before joining the Afghan Taliban. e UK cricket team coach murdered by assassins is thought to have been killed by Tablighi Jamaat operatives. of Islam through the eyes of the ulema and the Su s became increasingly important again during the twentieth century, particularly during the formation of the Afghan state and during the antiSoviet jihad. John Esposito describes the rise of Su sm in this way:
Reacting with disdain and dismay to the worldly seductions of imperial Islam, they were motivated by a desire to return to what they regarded as the purity and simplicity of the Prophet's time and driven by a deep devotional love of God that culminated in a quest for a direct, personal experience of the presence of God in this life.
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Su sm a ects rural Muslims in southern Afghanistan in a variety of ways. For example, the prevalence of ziarats (shrines) built over the graves of alleged holy men and women can be found throughout the south, and many venerate them. In the absence of real medicine or doctors, villagers place their faith in a culture of miracles and signs instead-here Su mysticism plays a role. A nuanced understanding of the interplay between the religious and the political phenomena in southern Afghanistan should include an appreciation of the importance of these beliefs to the vast majority of people.
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is also has implications for understanding aspects of the Taliban. A recent article published on the BBC's news with the headline "Can Su Islam Counter the Taliban?" described the experiences of visiting a Su shrine in Pakistan and talking to various experts and locals about the alleged relationship between the Taliban and Su sm.
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A er the explosion at the tomb of Rahman Baba, the much-loved Pashtu Su poet, there were many more articles to this e ect.
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Is Su sm a force, these articles asked, which can stand up against radicalism and so-called Talibanism? In the West, this has been a seductive idea for scholars and think-tanks, many of whom are familiar only with the tamer variants of Su sm. e increasing number of attacks targeting Su shrines throughout South Asia is of particular concern. Groups operating in the Khyber Agency of the FATA, as well as in the Swat Valley, have repeatedly attacked Su shrines and targeted Su pirs for assassination over the last two years. e shrine of Bahadur Baba, located in hills near Nowshera, east of Peshawar, was rocketed by militants in March-almost exactly one year a er militants destroyed the 400-year-old shrine of Abu Saeed Baba, also near Peshawar. 81 Many rural Pashtuns, particularly in the Katawaz, are very superstitious. e Islam of swaths of rural Afghanistan has more in common with mysticism than is commonly supposed. e role of djins, for example, is akin to that of evil spirits. is aspect of Su sm-the fear of rural peasants of the frightening mystical powers of the Su s-is much more powerful than the adherence to Su beliefs, which is negligible. e RAND Corporation published a study in 2003 that advocated encouraging "the elements within the Islamic mix that are most compatible with global peace and the international community and that are friendly to democracy and modernity." 86 is study was widely rumored to be the public face of a U.S. intelligence community plan to "engage with Su s" around the world as a strategy against Islamic radicalism. Such discussions fail to properly assess the realities of Su sm as experienced on the ground in southern Afghanistan and approach the matter as if religious practices in Afghanistan are similar to those in Pakistan. e two most important Su orders in Afghanistan-the Qadiri and Naqshbandi-are organized into brotherhoods. Pir Sayyid Ahmad Gailani heads the Qadiri order, which consists primarily of Pashtuns of southern and eastern Afghanistan.
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e Naqshbandi order of southern and northern Afghanistan is lead by the Mujaddidi family (Sebghatullah Mujaddidi).
88
Additionally, the analysis of Su sm's main ideas and practices in these discussions is derived from a reading of classical texts (mainly poetry), which, while important, fails to give a proper picture of the way Su sm interacts and has created religious networks.
Recognizing the importance of Su sm in Afghanistan, the Taliban have attempted to manipulate certain Su customs and traditions. Some Taliban have even sought to identify themselves as part of the Su tradition.
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is is similar to the dynamic that Bernt Glatzer describes of the "southern Pashtun tribesman seeking political leadership beyond his village" through the manipulation of "networks based on locality, economy, sectarianism, Su orders, religious schools, political and religious parties and so on."
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Pir Sayyid Ahmad Gailani has stated that "a majority of Taliban are Su s, mostly followers of the Qadiri and Naqshbandi movements."
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Some analysts have even alleged that Mullah Mohammad Omar, the nominal leader of the movement, is a member and local leader of the Naqshbandi order. Although many experts intensely dispute this contentious claim, Gailani states "Mullah Omar was raised as a Su before later embracing the more sever Wahhabi-inspired Islam."
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Even a brief examination of the Taliban's current propaganda output on its website, Al-Emarah, emphasizes that Taliban poetry and songs published in Pashtu rely strongly on the imagery, style, and forms used by the well-known classical Pashtun Su poets. Further, the biographies of jihadi "martyrs" posted on the website and in Taliban magazines call to mind the Su hagiographic traditions. Similarly, the authority of Mullah Omar's leadership rests in part on his risky but brilliant propaganda move in 1996 of taking the khirqa (a garment that Afghans believe to be the Prophet Mohammed's cloak) out of Kandahar's royal mausoleum for the rst time in 60 years and displaying it in a public rally e Naqshbandi order formed the base of the Jebhe-yi Nejat party at the time of the Soviet invasion. e Qadiri brotherhood formed the base of the Mahaz-i Melli party. e Naqasbandi order originated in Bukhara during the fourteenth century.
89 Interviews by Conrad Jennings in Kandahar City in 2007-08, however, suggested that the Taliban banned some Su activities in Kandahar during their rule (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) . ese interviewees suggested that the Taliban opposed Su groups. ey argued that there was a huge contradiction between Taliban and the Su s and that they did not like each other. ese interviewees also mentioned that the Taliban did not respect the Su shrines and mistrusted the pirs as well. as a way to identify himself with the Prophet.
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Mysticism similar to that practiced by Su s has long surrounded Mullah Omar. Omar reportedly started the Taliban a er a dream in which Allah came to him in the shape of a man, asking him to lead the faithful. e khirqa, for example, is believed by many Pashtuns to contain supernatural and mystical powers. is action in part represented Omar's absolute faith in his perceived divine right to rule and gave him legitimacy in his role as leader of the Afghan people ordained by Allah. A er Omar showed the cloak of the Prophet Mohammad to those present and received general acceptance by public, he invited the people to accept him as their leader by raising hands. 94 Whereas Omar had been a relative nonentity before this piece of religious theater, the audacious stunt catapulted him to a level of mystical power. Soon a erward, Omar was named Amir ul-Mumineen, "commander of the faithful"-not just of the Afghans but of all Muslims. He was given this title by almost 1,500 mullahs and religious scholars who were present in Kandahar.
As in Iraq, Su groups in Kandahar have allied themselves with the insurgency since 2003. A signi cant proportion of the rank-and-le members of the Taliban in southern Afghanistan (and increasingly in Pakistan) believe in the local traditions and customs that are identi ed as Su .
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Analyses of who the Taliban are and what they stand for have yet to convincingly o er an account of the movement's popular appeal, and fail to account for apparent Su aspects of the movement. It seems clear that the tradition of Su sm, rather than the practice (as associated with dervishes, for example), has been important in shaping the structure of rural resistance to secular authority. e full extent of Su contributions, however, to the networks that make up the insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan has not been properly explored, and there is not place here for a full discussion. It should be noted, though, that this is an important cultural feature that should not be underestimated.
Conclusion
e lack of strategic innovation on the side of the international coalition is striking, and the di culties in Afghanistan are in large part due to an intellectual failure to understand the country's social and political dynamics.
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e international community and, in particular, the U.S. and NATO forces have failed to thoroughly or systematically understand the religious foundations of the Taliban insurgency and jihad. Indeed, a rigorous and methodical examination of the Islamic realities of southern Afghanistan is potentially the most important arrow missing in the foreign forces' quiver. Although this lack of understanding has direct implications for U.S. and NATO kinetic military operations, it is even more important to the information operations. A counterinsurgency is rst and foremost an information war. One critical reason why the U.S. and NATO forces are not winning in Afghanistan is because they misunderstand certain components of the information 93 battlespace-most importantly those that involve religious dynamics. How can the United States and NATO protect the people of Afghanistan-the central tenet of successful counterinsurgencyif they do not understand the fundamental religious and societal drivers of the Afghan people?
Although this essay has merely scratched the surface of these extremely complex issues, it leaves no question that Islam and Islamic religious gures continue to play a critical role in the everyday life and politics of southern Afghanistan. Today, Su sm and Deobandism work together with traditional tribal mores in shaping the cognitive structures of southern Afghans. ese beliefs, for the most part, in uence the populations' social, political, and economic interactions. Both government and Taliban insurgent leadership have attempted to both shape and act in accordance with these normative structures, as well as to develop narratives to achieve the support and acquiescence of the southern, mostly rural Pashtun population. Ultimately, however, the ongoing conditions of the con ict environment that grips Afghanistan will most certainly in uence and mix with these beliefs and narratives to alter the fabric of Afghan society and thus will be the nal determinant as to the future path of Afghanistan. e Council denounces any action that further aggravates the pains and the su erings of the people and funnels disunity among the people of Afghanistan. us, the Council calls upon all those involved to prefer the national interests and Islamic values over their personal interests.
To ensure a full security as a key element in the country's progress, the Council unanimously decided that the traditional Loy Jirga (Grand Assembly) be convened, where people from all circles including religious scholars, intellectuals, tribal leaders, Jihadi and political gures and representatives from both Houses of the Parliament, the Taliban and Hiz e Islami (Hekmatyar's Islamic Party) and from the OIC and the United Nations are represented.
e Council nds as "reasonable" to obtain the agreement and endorsement of the neighboring countries and other relevant authorities on convening the Loy Jirga. We appreciate the interest already expressed by the new U.S. administration, Canada and France. For the anti-government forces to participate with con dence in the Loy Jirga, we suggest that their names be removed from the blacklist and that the United Nations guarantee their safety.
e Council unanimously decided that the lead role in negotiating with the Taliban be given to the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and the King of Saudi Arabia, Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud. Saudi Arabia is where the Holy Kabbah is located and is where the great Prophet of Islam, Muhammad (PBUH) is laid; it is where Quran was revealed by Allah and where angels have moved in and out. We are proud of the holy land and therefore, call upon the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques to kindly accept our request of helping relieve our pains.
e Council calls upon the Taliban to allow the closed madrassas and schools to reopen for the Muslim children of Afghanistan. Children are involved neither in war nor in politics. Let them learn to move out of obscurity into the light. Closing down schools is a grave hostility against the Muslim people of Afghanistan. It is against the Holy Quran order that has allowed education. We are hoping for a positive response as this is the voice of the Council of Ulema, Ministry of Education and the entire nation.
e Council calls upon all the Ulema (religious scholars) to remain vigilant as they have always been against malign intentions and actions by those who seek to take advantage of an opportunity.
As several times reminded in the past, the Council once again urges the media to avoid preaching and airing prohibited and hypocrite anti-Islam programs and immoral scenes and movies. is is the duty of the government to urgently avoid if such programs are aired. 
